Social Security Wealth, Inequality, and Life-cycle Saving: An Update by Sabelhaus, John & Henriques Volz, Alice
Social Security Wealth, Inequality, 
and Life-cycle Saving: An Update




Social Security Wealth, Inequality, and  
Life-cycle Saving: An Update 
John Sabelhaus 
University of Michigan 
Alice Henriques Volz 
Federal Reserve Board 
November 2020 
Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center, University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48104, mrdrc.isr.umich.edu, (734) 615-0422 
Acknowledgements 
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement and Disability Research Consortium 
through the University of Michigan Retirement and Disability Research Center Award 
RDR18000002-02. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author(s) 
and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System or any agency of the federal government. Neither the United States 
government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express 
or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or 
usefulness of the contents of this report. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, 
process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily 
constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States government 
or any agency thereof.  
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Jordan B. Acker; Huntington Woods; Michael J. Behm, Grand Blanc; Mark J. Bernstein, Ann 
Arbor; Paul W. Brown, Ann Arbor; Shauna Ryder Diggs, Grosse Pointe; Denise Ilitch, Bingham 
Farms; Ron Weiser, Ann Arbor; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mark S. Schlissel, ex officio  
 
Social Security Wealth, Inequality, and  
Life-cycle Saving: An Update 
Abstract 
Social Security wealth (SSW) is the present value of future benefits an individual will receive 
less the present value of future taxes they will pay. When an individual enters the labor force, 
they generally face a lifetime of taxes to pay before they will receive any benefits and, thus, their 
initial SSW is generally low or negative. As an individual works and pays into the system their 
SSW grows and generally peaks somewhere around typical Social Security benefit claiming 
ages. The accrual of SSW over the working life is most important for lower income workers 
because the progressive Social Security benefit formula means that taxes paid while working 
are associated with proportionally higher benefits in retirement. We estimate SSW for 
individuals in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1995 through 2019 using detailed 
labor force history and expectations modules. We use a pseudo-panel approach to empirically 
demonstrate life-cycle patterns of SSW accumulation and drawdown. We also show that 
including SSW in a comprehensive wealth measure generally reduces estimated levels of U.S. 
wealth inequality, but does not reverse the upward trend in top wealth shares. 
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Notes on update 
This working paper is an update of our National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Working Paper 27110, released in May 2020. That paper is forthcoming in the 
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth (CRIW) volume, Measuring and 
Understanding the Distribution and Intra/Inter-Generational Mobility of Income and 
Wealth. This update uses the additional year of Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
data (survey year 2019) that became available in September 2020. There is also a 
methodological change with respect to differential mortality, and a new appendix that 
describes on-going research using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) detailed 
earnings histories to improve life-cycle earnings imputations in the SCF. Neither the 
update to 2019 nor changes in differential mortality methods affect the conclusions in 
the NBER version.  
The new method for assigning mortality differentials by income is based on the 
work of Chetty et al. (2016), and replaces the approach we previously used based on 
the Congressional Budget Office long-term model and adapted to the SCF by Feiveson 
and Sabelhaus (2019). The Chetty et al. (2016) approach uses income tax records 
linked to Social Security mortality records, and the larger and more recent sample 
sharpens the correlation between income and mortality across the gender, age, and 
income distribution. Our previous approach assigned mortality differentials by three 
broad age groups and income quintile, while the Chetty et al. (2016) estimates make it 
possible to assign differentials by individual ages and income percentiles. See Appendix 
B for details about the improved differential mortality adjustments.  
ii 
One of the key methodological contributions in this study is estimating detailed 
life-cycle earnings profiles for SCF respondents. Appendix C describes on-going 
research to improve those estimates using Social Security Administration (SSA) 
earnings records linked to HRS longitudinal records. Access to the linked HRS/SSA 
earnings data was delayed until near the end of the performance period for this grant, 
and thus Appendix C is mostly focused on the first steps in using HRS earnings profiles: 
reconciling SCF and HRS linking variables. The two data sets are first aligned in terms 
of basic demographics including birth year, gender, education, and occupation. The 
second step is to look at heterogeneity within types by life-cycle labor force attachment 
— number of years worked full and part time. Our on-going research is focused on how 
best to use observed earnings profiles for a given demographic type and pattern of 
labor force attachment to improve the imputations of life-cycle earnings in the SCF. 
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1. Introduction 
Wealth inequality in the United States is high and has been increasing, measured 
using either the income-capitalization approach (Saez and Zucman 2016; Smith, Zidar, 
and Zwick 2019) or wealth surveys (Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus 2016). 
However, these estimates of wealth inequality do not include the present value of Social 
Security benefits less the present value of Social Security taxes — or Social Security 
wealth (SSW). This omission is important because Social Security dominates other 
forms of retirement income for most families (Sabelhaus and Volz 2019) and Social 
Security has been growing relative to the size of the overall economy. A comprehensive 
measure of household wealth that includes SSW provides new insights into overall 
wealth inequality and our understanding of life-cycle saving behavior.  
Aggregate Social Security benefits in the U.S. are now roughly the same order of 
magnitude as the sum of total pension benefits received and retirement account 
withdrawals. Social Security benefits are also growing relative to the economy’s size, 
from roughly 4% of personal income in the early 1970s to almost 6% today. Focusing on 
just the benefit side of SSW, the present value of Social Security benefits for everyone 
who has paid anything into the system was $73.3 trillion in 2019.1 Thus, the present 
value of Social Security benefits is estimated to be roughly double all other household-
sector pension and retirement account assets combined, and approximately three-
fourths the size of all conventionally measured household net worth. Social Security is 
                                               
1 Table VI.F2 in the 2019 Trustees Report, Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security 
Administration, available at https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2019/VI_F_infinite.html#1000308.  
2 
also an important retirement wealth equalizer, as employer-sponsored pension and 
retirement accounts accrue disproportionately to high wealth families (Sabelhaus and 
Volz 2019).  
Unlike pensions and other forms of retirement wealth, aggregate net SSW is 
zero, because there are no associated private claims to future production reflected in 
the market value of financial assets. The relatively small OASDI trust fund in principle 
represents real claims of Social Security beneficiaries on the rest of government, but 
even those claims are in the form of government bonds that are also the liabilities of 
taxpayers. Individual SSW (the present value of future benefits less the present value of 
future taxes for a given person) does vary over the life cycle, meaning some (usually 
older) participants have positive SSW, while others (the young) have negative SSW. 
Indeed, the rise and fall of SSW over the life cycle is an important form of saving and 
dissaving that is measurable, just like any other type of life-cycle wealth.  
SSW also varies within age groups by lifetime income because of the 
progressive Social Security benefit formula, and thus lower lifetime income workers 
have higher SSW accrual rates (relative to income) while they are working. In a life-
cycle sense, workers with low lifetime earnings are “saving” much more than higher 
lifetime income groups at any given working age, because each tax dollar paid is 
associated with a larger increase in the net present value of benefits they will ultimately 
receive. The prediction for conventionally measured saving and household wealth is 
clear. Lower lifetime earners with relatively high SSW can achieve the same total wealth 
(relative to income) with less (conventionally measured) saving.  
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The expected interplay between conventionally measured household saving and 
SSW is by no means a new idea, but the empirical evidence is limited by the lack of a 
comprehensive data set with both types of wealth for the same individuals. In this paper, 
we begin with the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which has high-quality 
income and balance sheet data for a representative sample (including a high-wealth 
oversample) of the population. We construct measures of SSW for individuals using the 
retrospective work history and prospective work expectations modules in the SCF with 
imputed earnings based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), solving for future 
payroll taxes, own worker benefits, and spouse and survivor benefits. We then use a 
pseudo-panel methodology — tracking birth cohorts across the nine survey waves 
between 1995 and 2019 — to study life-cycle SSW patterns and how SSW interacts 
with other balance sheet components to determine overall wealth inequality. 
There are four major takeaways from this exercise. First, aggregate SSW is 
quantitatively important when compared to other components of household wealth. As 
we detail in the next section, there are multiple conceptual issues when estimating 
SSW, and the choice of discount rate and counting scheduled versus payable benefits 
has a big impact on any given SSW empirical estimate. Using what we refer to below as 
“expected scheduled” SSW and our preferred 2.8% real discount rate, we estimate that 
the present discounted value (PDV) of future benefits less future taxes for all SCF 
respondents and their spouse/partners in 2019 was about $24 trillion, the difference 
between a PDV of benefits of $38 trillion and a PDV of taxes of $14 trillion. However, we 
estimate that only $19 trillion of the $24 trillion in SSW is payable under current law. For 
some perspective, the published measure of household net worth in the SCF was 
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around $96 trillion in 2019 (Bhutta et al. 2020) and the PDV of Defined Benefit (DB) 
pension benefits was $19 trillion (Sabelhaus and Volz 2019). Our estimate of SSW in 
2019 is higher — $33 trillion — using Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) discount 
rates.2 
The second main finding is that SSW — unsurprisingly — is quantitatively more 
important for otherwise low-wealth families at any given age. There is a myriad of ways 
to measure wealth inequality, and although the alternative approaches to sorting or 
constructing summary measures affect estimated levels of inequality at any point in 
time, there are common trends across the various measures, so little is lost by focusing 
on one specific distributional approach. Our baseline wealth inequality measure is the 
sum of published SCF net worth and our estimated household-level DB wealth 
(Sabelhaus and Volz 2019), what we refer to as “household” wealth. Our baseline 
sorting mechanism involves assigning a given percentage of SCF respondents and 
spouses/partners (not households) within each age group into the corresponding wealth 
groups, which eliminates confounding life-cycle effects (wealth generally increases with 
age) on wealth grouping. Thus, our “top 10%” includes the top 10% of respondents and 
                                               
2 The conceptually equivalent OCACT published SSW is $38 trillion for 2019. The SCF-based 
aggregate SSW estimate is only slightly less than OCACT, but that obscures larger differences 
in both sides of the SSW computation (the PDV of benefits and the PDV of taxes). As 
discussed later in the paper, we are missing future benefits (and taxes) for persons 15 and 
older who are not SCF respondents or spouses/partners. We don’t simulate future transitions 
onto disability, and we don’t count spouse/survivor benefits because of future or past 
marriages. The omission of disability may have a substantial effect on our SSW estimates 
because individuals have a 25 percent probability of becoming disabled before age 65. See, 
for example, the OCACT annual actuarial note on disability, available at 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/ran6/an2020-6.pdf. 
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spouses/partners within each age group, as ranked by the sum of published SCF wealth 
and our estimated DB wealth.  
Sorting by household wealth within age groups and person-weighting implies that 
our measures always answer questions of the form, “how does expanding the wealth 
concept affect the average wealth holdings at a given age of a conventionally measured 
wealth group?” We show that SSW is relatively much more important for low-wealth 
individuals. For example, the bottom 50% of persons ages 35 to 44 in 2019 had 
average household wealth around $22,000. However, the same group had average 
expected SSW of just over $50,000, the difference between a PDV of benefits around 
$137,000 and a PDV of taxes around $87,000. This is unsurprising given that low-
wealth individuals have much lower lifetime incomes, and the Social Security tax and 
benefit formulas are inherently progressive, even though differential mortality offsets 
some of that redistribution. In contrast, the top 10% of persons aged 35 to 44 in 2019 
had, on average, about $2,000,000 of household wealth. Their expected SSW was 
$86,000, the difference between a PDV of benefits around $254,000 and a PDV of 
taxes around $169,000. Thus, although SSW rises with other wealth components 
(because both increase with lifetime income) the ratio of SSW to household wealth falls 
as household wealth rises.  
The third major takeaway is that although incorporating SSW into household 
wealth has a substantial impact on wealth inequality levels, it does not change overall 
trends in top wealth shares. For example, while the top 10% share of household wealth 
(within age-sorted and person-weighted) increased from 53% to 63% between 1995 and 
2019, the expanded wealth share that includes SSW increased from 45% to 55%. In an 
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important sense, adding SSW deepens, rather than ameliorates, concerns about rising 
wealth inequality, because roughly the same percentage point change in wealth share is 
applied to a much lower base. In addition, adding SSW does not reverse the exploding 
average wealth gap between the young and old, especially if we measure wealth using 
payable SSW. 
The final takeaway is based on connecting the estimated SSW values across 
cross-section survey waves for 10-year birth cohorts. The triennial structure of the SCF 
gives us up to nine pseudo-panel SSW observations per birth cohort over the quarter-
century between 1995 and 2019. By connecting the cohort averages between survey 
waves and drawing out the life-cycle patterns of SSW by age, we show how SSW starts 
out negative at young ages, increases steadily through retirement, and then gradually 
decreases as the remaining expected years of life (and years of expected benefit 
receipt) decline at older ages. Age ranges in which multiple cohorts overlap show us 
how average SSW is evolving across cohorts, due to a combination of demographic 
(through spouse/survivor benefits) and lifetime earnings effects. 
The life-cycle shapes of SSW accumulation and decumulation are similar across 
wealth groups, but there are important differences in SSW relative to income that can 
be interpreted in terms of life-cycle saving rates. At age 60, average SSW relative to 
average permanent income is roughly 600% for the bottom 50% wealth group, 400% for 
the next 40% wealth group, and 100% for the top 10% wealth group.3 Given the 
observed average income growth between ages 30 and 60 across the three wealth 
groups, those ratios translate roughly into annual saving rates of (accumulation of SSW 
                                               
3 See Bhutta, et al (2020) for a discussion of the SCF permanent income measure.  
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relative to income) of 15%, 12%, and 5% as we move from the lowest to highest wealth 
groups. In that sense, low- and middle-wealth families are saving a much larger fraction 
of their income than what is suggested by conventional saving measures (Feiveson and 
Sabelhaus 2019). One could say that low- and middle-wealth families just save 
differently than high wealth families, by participating in Social Security.  
2. Social Security wealth 
A given individual’s Social Security wealth (SSW) is the present discounted value 
of their future benefits less the present discounted value of their future taxes. SSW 
estimates can be constructed at any point in the life cycle using earnings histories and 
various assumptions about continued work and benefit claim ages. The discussion here 
focuses on two main scenarios, which we refer to as the “expected” and “termination” 
approaches to measuring SSW as of a given age. The expected concept is based on 
respondent-reported future work expectations, and thus includes future taxes and 
benefits. The termination concept — borrowed from the Defined Benefit (DB) pension 
lexicon — assumes the participant does not work in the future, and thus, does not 
accrue additional benefits beyond what they have already earned. The two SSW 
measures in principle provide different perspectives on the evolution of SSW over the 
life cycle, and on how policy changes will affect the life-cycle profiles of SSW.  
Social Security wealth defined 
In the most generic sense, SSW for an individual at age a is the discounted 
present value of survival-adjusted benefits less taxes, 
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SSWa= � (benefitss- taxess)
T
s=a+1
 Πs/a βs-a 
where T is the maximum lifespan,  Πs/a is the probability of surviving to age s as of age 
a, and β is a period discount factor.  
Moving from the generic representation to specific empirical measures requires 
introducing life-cycle timing for benefits and taxes, which in turn depend on the 
underlying life-cycle patterns of earnings and Social Security system parameters. 
Denote the last age that the individual works using m, and the first age that benefits are 
received using n. The specific benefit formula for an individual depends on their birth 
cohort, c. Benefits at age s are then given by, 
benefitss= b(y�m, n, c)      ∀ s≥n, 0 otherwise  
where y�m is the vector of earnings through age m, and b(.) is a benefit calculator that 
maps lifetime earnings through age m and benefit start age n into a benefit level at age 
s for a member of birthyear cohort c. 
Taxes paid at age s depend on earnings at age s and the calendar-year specific 
tax rate τ and taxable maximum ymax. Calendar year is the sum of cohort birthyear (c) 
and current age (s), so the tax parameters can also be written in terms of c + s. That is, 
for all ages s through the last working age m,  
taxess= τc+s * max(ys, yc+s
max)      ∀ s≤m, 0 otherwise  
In the specific estimates described below, we will generally assume that benefits 
commence when working ends (n = m+1) or at the earliest possible age for benefits 
(generally 62) if the individual stops working prior to the earliest benefit age, but there is 
nothing in the notational framework above that requires those conditions.  
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When we adopt the simplifying assumption that benefit start age n=max(m+1,62), 
SSW is simplified to a two-dimensional object in current age (a) and stop work age (m). 
For a given member of cohort c, 
SSWa









s-a�   
Various combinations of a and m answer different questions about the role of 
SSW in life-cycle wealth accumulation and inequality. Measures of expected SSW are 
most useful for thinking about variation in money’s worth or progressivity across and 
within cohorts, or overall system finances. Measures of termination (or conditional 
termination) SSW are more useful for capturing the incentive effects of over the life 
cycle.  
Money’s worth and system finances  
One useful reference point for stop work age (m) is the expected value. When m 
is set to the expected (or already-realized for current beneficiaries) stop work age 
values (denoted by *), the average across all members of a given birth cohort of the 
constructed SSWa* map out the mean life-cycle pattern of SSW by age for that cohort. 
Those typical life-cycle SSW patterns will vary across birth cohorts, depending on the 
Social Security tax and benefit parameters faced by that cohort, their lifetime earnings, 
and their stop work ages. The overall mean value of SSWa* for any given cohort is 
generally negative at young ages because the present value of taxes to be paid 
exceeds the present value of benefits to be received, given appropriate discount rates. 
The mean SSWa* becomes positive around age 30, peaks at some age around 
retirement, and then declines as retirees draw down their accumulated SSW.  
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The life-cycle patterns of mean expected SSWa* are immediately useful for 
understanding how changes in Social Security policy transfer resources across and 
within generations, and for understanding overall system finances. Every cohort begins 
life (at age a=0) with a mean value for their expected SSW0*, and that average tells us 
about the extent of intercohort redistribution. At the same time, there are important 
differences in SSW0* within cohorts because benefit replacement rates decline with 
lifetime income, making the system more progressive. Given the progressive Social 
Security system parameters, the lower lifetime income members of a cohort begin life 
with less negative or even positive SSW0*, and that is offset by the fact that the average 
SSW0* of the higher lifetime income group in the same cohort is more negative than the 
overall cohort average. There is some empirical uncertainty about how much SSW0* 
varies within cohorts because the higher replacement rates enjoyed by lower lifetime 
income participants are offset at least in part by higher mortality rates.4   
Across and within cohort, net redistribution can be measured at any point in the 
life cycle, including at age 0, by computing values for mean SSW0* within and across 
cohorts. Most empirical estimates of Social Security progressivity/redistribution use a 
variant of the SSW concept in the notation above. For example, the Congressional 
Budget Office redistribution measures are based on the value of taxes paid and benefits 
received for individuals at retirement, but it is similar to SSW0* in the sense that it 
                                               
4 There are also some indications that mortality differentials are rising, which makes the system 
less progressive. See for example, the National Academies study, The Growing Gap in Life 




captures taxes paid and benefits received over the entire life cycle.5 Rather than 
discount all tax and benefit flows back to age zero, taxes paid and benefits received 
before age 65 are grown forward by the real discount rate, while taxes paid and benefits 
received after that are discounted back to age 65. These measures answer the direct 
question, “as of age 65, how much has an individual paid into the system, and how 
much will they get back out?” CBO reports the ratio of (discounted) lifetime benefits 
received to lifetime taxes paid — the so called “money’s worth” ratio — and the two 
components relative to (discounted) lifetime income. The CBO estimates show that 
Social Security is indeed progressive, even after controlling for observable mortality 
differentials. Lifetime benefits received are about twice lifetime taxes paid for the lowest 
lifetime income quintile, and the ratio of lifetime benefits to taxes falls to about 60% for 
the highest lifetime income quintile.6 
One oft-cited example of these sorts of money’s worth or net redistribution 
measures based on expected SSW is the introduction of the Social Security system 
itself. The earliest recipients (oldest workers) paid relatively little in tax yet were entitled 
to the same benefits as the younger workers who would face a lifetime of taxes before 
they received any benefits. In that sense, those earliest recipients received a substantial 
wealth transfer from future generations when the system began. In the year the program 
                                               
5 The latest CBO projections are available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55590. For a more 
detailed discussion of progressivity in Social Security in published CBO reports, see 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/12-15-progressivity-
ss.pdf.  
6 OCACT also publishes annual money’s worth ratios, for hypothetical scaled workers, available 
at www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/ran7/index.html. The OCACT lifetime money’s worth ratios show 
the same progressive patterns as the CBO estimates.  
12 
was put in place, their cohort mean SSWa* went from zero to a large positive number, 
which was in principle offset by large negatives for younger (and unborn) cohorts.7  
Another overlooked yet more recent example was the substantial expansion of 
Social Security in the early 1970s, because the birth cohorts who were nearing or 
already in retirement when the expansion occurred received much higher benefits after 
the policy change, yet at the same time they had paid less in taxes (relative to the new 
tax schedules that accompanied the higher benefits) during most of their working years. 
This substantial intergenerational wealth transfer is likely a direct contributor to the 
observed patterns of labor force participation of older men in the quarter century 
following the policy change. Middle-aged and older workers received a substantial 
positive wealth shock, and they reacted by retiring earlier, likely triggering or 
exacerbating the decline in labor force participation that lasted through the mid-1990s. 
Capturing wealth transfers by looking at expected SSW across and within birth 
cohorts is also relevant for ongoing policy discussions. There is a direct connection 
between system solvency and the expected SSW measures described above. When 
the timespans for computing SSW are limited to the Social Security 75-year valuation 
period, the population-weighted average expected SSW across in-scope cohort groups 
is just the overall system actuarial deficit (plus the current trust fund balance). The 
overall actuarial deficit is currently estimated to be negative. That is consistent with the 
idea that although workers approaching or already in retirement have large positive 
                                               
7 The offset is “in principle” because the SSW of future generations is an endogenous object 
that depends on the trajectory for future earnings, population growth, and real discount rates, 
which may in turn be affected by the policy change (Leimer 2016).  
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expected SSW, younger and even unborn workers (anyone who will begin working 
within the 75-year window) have more than offsetting negative expected SSW.  
How should we think about expected SSW in a world of projected insolvency? 
Although there is a great deal of uncertainty about how Social Security insolvency will 
be resolved, there is a legal baseline that can be used as an analytical starting point. 
The Social Security system has no borrowing authority — the system can only spend 
what is in the trust fund. Thus, failure to act before the trust fund asset reserves deplete 
will eventually lead to benefit cuts. In that sense, the expected SSW measures under 
the no-action (“payable”) scenario should be computed using benefit streams that have 
those benefit reductions built-in. Although CBO and other observers also report the so-
called “scheduled” scenario in their money’s worth calculations, policy analysis of 
solvent alternatives is appropriately based on comparisons against the payable 
scenario. In that sense, expected SSW profiles already include reductions in benefits 
after the trust fund asset reserves deplete, to be disproportionately borne by young and 
even unborn cohorts.  
Expected and termination Social Security wealth 
Expected SSW captures how much an individual at a given age expects to 
receive from and pay into the Social Security system going forward and, when 
aggregated, is useful for characterizing lifetime Social Security redistribution across and 
within cohorts. There is an alternative concept of SSW suggested by the notation above 
— the termination value — that is more relevant for thinking about the incentive effects 
of Social Security over the life cycle (Coile and Gruber 2007; Goda, Shoven, and Slavov 
2011). The termination value is the starting point for measuring the net return to working 
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an additional year, because it is the PDV of benefits earned as of a given age because 
of work and taxes paid at earlier ages. Measuring the net return (in terms of Social 
Security) just involves computing the change in PDV of benefits from working an 
additional year and subtracting the taxes paid in that extra year of work, then dividing 
the net by current age termination SSW or income.8  
For our purposes, the key question is which of the two SSW concepts is most 
appropriate for completing existing measures of household wealth inequality? That is, 
should we be adding expected SSW or termination SSW to the other components of 
household wealth when constructing a more comprehensive wealth measure for 
studying inequality? The answer is not obvious, and the underlying reasons why it is not 
obvious raise more general questions about measuring life-cycle saving, wealth 
accumulation, and wealth inequality.  
One way to think about which concept of SSW is most appropriate for overall 
wealth inequality is to start with the case where it does not matter, which is the SSW of 
an individual after they have stopped working. In retirement, expected and termination 
SSW are identical — both are just the discounted present value of the future benefits 
the individual will receive until they die. As in a DB pension plan, the individual has 
earned the right to those benefits, and the individual has no further offsetting obligations 
in terms of plan contributions or taxes. Wealth is just the discounted present value of 
those future benefits. In a DB plan, the financial assets held by the plan exactly match 
those future benefit claims. Assuming future taxpayers will not renege on those 
                                               
8 Indeed, the data set we have developed for this paper is well-suited to empirically investigate 
the work (and saving) incentives associated with Social Security.  
15 
promised benefits, SSW is well-defined, measurable, and equivalent under the two 
concepts.  
Prior to retirement, the values for expected and termination SSW can be 
different, particularly early in the life cycle, and it could matter which is added to the 
other balance sheet components to create a comprehensive wealth measure. Again, the 
appropriate choice is tied to the specific question being asked. For example, one could 
ask, “as of a given age prior to retirement, how does projected retirement readiness 
vary within and across generations?” This sort of question is appropriately answered 
using expected values for SSW (and DB pension benefits) as of retirement age (Jacobs 
et al. 2019). However, the internally consistent answer to this question also involves 
expected values for all components of household wealth as of retirement age. If the age 
for evaluating future retirement readiness is (for example) set to 40, the expected 
retirement readiness analysis involves computing SSW and DB pension wealth based 
on expected future work through retirement age, because age 40 termination values are 
uninformative about the wealth that individual will hold going into retirement. The other 
components of household wealth should also be adjusted using the same expectations 
about future work, along with some assumptions about saving out of the income from 
that future work.  
An alternative to the retirement-readiness question involves asking the more 
general question about life-cycle saving and wealth accumulation, “as of a given age, 
how much wealth has the individual accumulated?” Setting aside SSW for a moment, 
wealth in this sense is just marketable assets less liabilities, which is exactly the 
concept built into the household sector balance sheets in the Financial Accounts of the 
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United States, and exactly the concept used in the literature on household wealth 
inequality. One component of that household wealth measure is the present value of 
future DB benefits, and there are marketable financial assets underlying the DB benefit 
claims.9 The marketable assets held by DB plans are consistent with termination values 
— DB plans are not legally required to hold assets against expected or continuation 
benefits — and thus the appropriate corresponding discounted present value of DB at 
the micro level uses the termination concept (Sabelhaus and Volz 2019).  
Given the treatment of DB plans, it seems that adding termination values for 
SSW is also the right answer to the question about how to complete the measures of 
household wealth for purposes of studying wealth inequality. However, the fact that 
termination SSW is always zero or positive — an individual will not pay any more taxes 
if they never work again — highlights the conundrum with using termination values. DB 
plans have underlying assets to offset the liabilities of the plans to their participants. Yet 
the wealth claims of individuals with positive SSW have no legal basis without the 
wealth claims against those with negative SSW, and negative SSW is necessarily 
associated with continued working. Thus, although termination value seems more 
consistent with studying wealth inequality at a given age, the expected values are more 
relevant when studying wealth inequality across age groups and time. Thus, most of our 
focus is on expected SSW in the empirical work, though we do show termination values 
(mostly for reference and clarification of expected values) at various points.  
                                               
9 Technically, in the Financial Accounts, the value of DB pension claims is the sum of 
marketable assets held by the plans and unfunded liabilities. The unfunded liabilities are 
assets of the household sector offset by claims against the sectors (corporate, noncorporate, 
government) that sponsor the plans.  
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3. Data and methods 
Our goal is to produce empirical estimates of Social Security Wealth (SSW) that 
can be combined with existing household-level wealth measures and, thus, create more 
comprehensive wealth measures for studying life-cycle saving, wealth accumulation, 
and wealth inequality. Achieving this involves starting with high-quality, household-level 
balance sheet data, then adding the various estimates of SSW as described in the 
previous section. Our empirical framework makes it possible to create both expected 
and termination SSW under alternative (scheduled and payable) benefit scenarios and 
various discounting assumptions. In this section, we describe the microdata, explain 
how we construct the SSW measures, benchmark those estimates against published 
Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) values, and show how aggregate SSW estimates 
compare to other household wealth components.  
The microdata used here is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1995 
through 2019. The SCF is a triennial cross-section focused on household balance 
sheets. It has extensive information about incomes, demographics, and labor force 
experiences.10 The SCF sampling strategy is unique among public-use household 
surveys, as about one-fourth of the sample is drawn from administrative data records in 
order to capture the top of the wealth distribution and, thus, overall aggregate wealth.11 
                                               
10 See Bhutta et al. (2020) for a discussion of the SCF and the most recent results, for survey 
year 2019.  
11 See Feiveson and Sabelhaus (2019), Bricker et al. (2016), and Batty et al. (2019) for a 
discussion of how well the SCF captures macro aggregates over time, and how the SCF 
results on wealth distribution compare to other studies based on a straight read of the 
administrative data. Another key, but often neglected, advantage to using the SCF is the 
extensive interconnectedness between income and balance sheet components in the survey 
instrument that greatly improve data quality. For example, respondents may initially report no 
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This oversample of high-wealth households, in addition to the detail on household 
portfolios, makes the SCF uniquely qualified for estimating how adding SSW affects life-
cycle saving, wealth accumulation, and wealth inequality. Since the SCF is a series of 
cross-section snapshots, calculating the PDVs of Social Security taxes and benefits 
requires estimating life-cycle earnings for individuals and their spouses/partners. 
Estimating PDVs (for both SSW and DB pensions) requires individual mortality rates, 
which we differentiate by age, sex, income, and birth year.  
Life-cycle work and earnings 
The first crucial data development step is to use SCF detailed work history and 
work expectations modules to create life-cycle earnings measures from the cross-
section observations, because life-cycle earnings are the key to PDVs of taxes and 
benefits. The SCF data on labor force participation, employment, unemployment 
earnings, current job characteristics, past jobs, and expected future work are collected 
in detailed modules for both the respondent and spouse/partner (if present).12 The 
sequence of questions in the SCF labor modules focus first on current employment 
                                               
owned businesses, but then later in the survey reveal that they think of themselves as self-
employed, which triggers reconsideration of the owned business questions. Similarly, the 
existence of various types of DB pensions and DC/IRA accounts is checked in various ways 
throughout the survey, as respondents are asked at various points about coverage, balances, 
and benefits/withdrawals in different ways. The extensive SCF case review process 
undertaken by Federal Reserve Board staff is largely focused on sorting through what is 
sometimes conflicting information about these complicated balance sheet items in the raw 
data.  
12 In SCF microdata files the respondent is always recoded to be the man in a different sex 
couple, and the individual closest to 40 years old in a same-sex couple. This underscores the 
use of data for both respondent and spouse/partner in the empirical work here, because there 
are many cases where the spouse/partner will be the primary earner.  
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status, then (if employed) current main job characteristics, including pensions. That is 
followed by modules on employment and job histories and expected future work.  
The idea of working versus not working is a simple idea for most survey 
respondents, but there are a variety of circumstances that can complicate the issue for 
some. Many respondents have multiple statuses: They are both working (full or part 
time) and a student, homemaker, volunteer, or some other status that is generally 
considered out of the labor force. The SCF instrument lists the possible situations, and 
then collapses (for the purpose of determining survey question sequence) people into 
three bins: not working, working full time, and working part time. The information one 
would like about the individual varies with the bin, and the SCF survey instrument is 
tailored to the three groups accordingly.  
If the individual reports working full or part time, they are asked a number of 
questions about their current main job.13 Many of these questions are standard in 
household surveys, including whether the respondent is self-employed or working for 
someone else, how much they earn through a regular salary and/or variable pay, their 
usual hours and weeks worked, their industry and occupation, and the size of the firm 
they work for. The key incremental information about their current job, relative to most 
cross-sectional data sets, that makes it possible to start building the longitudinal 
variables is that respondents are also asked when they started the current job and when 
they expect to stop working on the current job.  
                                               
13 The survey also collects limited information about second jobs, but that is not used for 
purposes of classifying work status.  
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After collecting the current job data, the survey turns to work histories. There are 
three distinct sequences of questions for individuals who report not working, working full 
time, and working part time, respectively. The survey instrument’s goal is to retrieve 
some common work history meta data for the three groups, including the total number 
of years worked full time and part time, and details about the longest full-time job ever 
worked. The “longest job” questions are a subset of the information collected about the 
current main job, including salary in the last year they worked the job, industry, 
occupation, and self-employed versus working for someone else. The question 
sequences vary because the point of reference differs by current work status. For 
example, the leading question “have you ever worked full-time?” will only make sense to 
respondents who are currently not working or working part-time.  
Even with carefully tailored question sequences, there is still some respondent 
confusion about and disagreement among the various work history responses that must 
be addressed in the data construction. For example, one common tendency is for 
respondents to confuse current main job “type” with their current employer. If they have 
been working the same type of job their whole adult life, they will sometimes answer 
that they started the current job at a young age, even though the earlier job(s) they are 
thinking about involved a different employer. The self-employed are particularly prone to 
answering they have been in the current job since childhood, though in their case some 
of them have indeed worked in family businesses all their lives. Building the longitudinal 
work histories requires a balancing of sometimes conflicting information from the current 
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job, the longest full-time job, and the overall number of years worked full and part 
time.14   
Forward-looking measures are based on what respondents report they expect to 
do in the future and, thus, the questions on future work are crucial. Again, the specific 
questions vary with current work status, but the general idea is to divide the future into 
periods of expected full time, part time, and not working. The majority of the working 
population — those who are working full time in the survey year — are the easiest, 
because the survey instrument simply focuses on when they expect to stop full-time 
work, whether they expect to switch to part-time after that and, if so, when they expect 
to stop working completely. The currently not working and working part time are first 
asked if they expect to start working full time before the rest of the question sequence 
kicks in. Again, there are sometimes conflicting answers vis-a-vis the current main job, 
situations where the respondent initially says they “never expect to stop” doing the 
particular type of job they are in, but then later say they actually do expect to stop at a 
particular age.  
Reconciling those conflicting answers is key for generating expected stop work 
wages. Using the reconciled data, expected retirement of well-attached workers lines up 
well against observations from other data sets and the actual (recalled) retirement 
behavior of older respondents in the SCF itself (Sabelhaus 2019). The specific concept 
of last-work age we use in the expected SSW calculations is somewhat dependent on 
the respondent’s current work status because retirement and Social Security benefit 
                                               
14 The code that reconciles the various employment history variables is available from the 
authors upon request.  
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claiming are imperfectly correlated. If the respondent currently works full time or expects 
to become full time in the future, their expected last-work age is when they say they will 
stop working full time, because many respondents state they expect to transition to part-
time work at the end of their career. If they are currently part-time, then expected last-
work age is the age at which they expect to completely stop working. All answers are 
capped at 70, the age Social Security benefits no longer accrue. 
Figure 1. Respondent-reported expected last-work age 
 
Notes: Authors' calculations using 1995 through 2019 SCF. Conditional on not yet receiving 
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The reconciled expected last-work ages vary predictably across current age and 
current work status (Figure 1). Younger workers tend to give lower ages for expected 
stopping work than older workers with any current work status. The average expected 
stop work age increases with age, because expectations become more realistic, and 
because some transition from working to not working or claiming benefits (those already 
claiming are not in Figure 1). Also, expected last-work age at any given age (younger 
than 65 to 69) for full-time workers increased, on average, about two years between the 
1995 and 2016 survey waves, which is in line with actual and projected Social Security 
benefit claiming patterns.15 Thus, our expected SSW calculations capture the 
phenomenon that younger cohorts at a given age and (real) income will have higher 
benefit PDVs (given the same discount rate) because they expect to work longer. 
Whether or not the higher benefit PDVs translates into higher expected SSW depends 
on taxes and mortality.  
Calculating Social Security benefits requires earnings at each point in the life 
cycle. Earnings are assigned at each age for which an individual is predicted to be 
working either full time or part time. We estimate an earnings equation that is a function 
of age and its square to provide age-specific for each sex/education combination. This 
provides a sex- and education-specific growth rate for each age from 18 through 70. For 
individuals working at the time of interview, their current wage is used to project future 
wages through expected retirement, using the growth rates described. The wage is 
further adjusted based on their current and projected future work status using a simple 
scalar, i.e., expected full-time to part-time transitions involve a 50% earnings reduction.  
                                               
15 See, for example, Dudel and Myrskylä (2017).  
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Retrospective earnings are based on the “longest past job” questions in the SCF. 
Workers are asked about how much they were earning (and at what age) when they left 
their most important career job. We use that information along with current earnings to 
pin down a life-cycle earnings trajectory. We use the same age-specific growth rates as 
above to trace out expected earnings over the tenure of one’s longest past job. If an 
individual does not have a long past job, his survey earnings are also used to predict 
earnings earlier in the life cycle. For an individual with a long past job, the final earnings 
from the long job are used to fill in ages preceding the beginning of the long job. For 
ages between the end of a long job and the beginning of the current job, a linear 
mapping is used to connect the long job final salary and the predicted start salary on a 
current job. If no earnings are reported in the survey, which is especially problematic for 
those who report never having worked full time, we assign median earnings for ages 20 
to 24 in survey year as a baseline if an individual is younger than 30, or the minimum 
wage for those at other ages (who expect to work in the future). As in the prospective 
earnings calculations, life-cycle earnings trajectories are adjusted for changes in work 
status.16 
  
                                               
16 Benchmarking our estimated PDVs of taxes and benefits against OCACT aggregates (see 
Appendix) suggests that our assumptions about earnings may be conservative on net, though 
it is not clear how much we are missing because of limiting our calculations to SCF 
respondents and spouses. The SCF essentially captures aggregate taxable earnings in the 
survey year, but the PDVs are low, suggesting our assigned earnings are too low at other 
points in the life cycle. This is an important area for further research.  
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Demographics and differential mortality 
The core demographics in the SCF (age, sex, and income) are key inputs to 
estimating present values for retirement income streams through a differential mortality 
adjustment. Constructing the present value of Social Security and DB pension incomes 
requires survival probabilities, which are computed for each SCF respondent and 
spouse/partner through age 99. The starting point for the survival adjustments used 
here to transform data from the cross section to the longitudinal structure is Social 
Security Administration cohort mortality by age and sex.17 The second step is a 
differential mortality adjustment by income percentile within age and sex groups based 
on Chetty et al. (2016), based on income tax records linked to Social Security death 
records. Appendix B explains how the Chetty et al. (2016) mortality differentials are 
applied to the SCF data in a way that preserves average mortality from the Social 
Security Administration and relative mortality by income across age, sex, and cohort 
population groups.18  
  
                                               
17 The SSA mortality data is available at 
www.ssa.gov/OACT/HistEst/Death/2019/DeathProbabilities2019.html. 
18 Differential mortality is explicitly incorporated in the Social Security actuarial projections as 
well, with an adjustment based on career average earnings. See 
www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study124.pdf.  
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Actual versus predicted benefits 
Estimated life-cycle earnings and expected last-work ages are the main inputs 
into the SSW calculator. We compute own worker benefits based of the expected 
retirement last-work age, then initiate the benefit stream at max(62, stop work age+1). 
We also calculate expected spouse/survivor benefits for married couples, and the PDVs 
are computed using own and spouse/partner differential mortality.  
The approach to calculating SSW raises the question about choosing our 
computed benefits versus actual respondent reported values when the actual benefits 
are available. Across survey waves, the fraction of respondents for whom we have 
actual benefit values (and benefit start ages) increases predictably with age (Figure 2). 
In the calculations below, we use the actual benefit values, including those for 
retirement, spousal, survivor, and disability when they are available. Reported benefit 
aggregates in the SCF for respondents and spouse/partners were about 86% of actual 
benefits paid in 2018.19 We consider that ratio quite good, given that we are missing 
benefits paid to individuals outside the SCF sample frame (especially those living in 
institutional settings) or residing in an SCF household where they are not the 
respondent or spouse/partner. Still, it is possible that some respondents are making 
systematic errors, such as reporting benefits after Medicare premiums are deducted.  
  
                                               
19 Another important exercise for future work that will likely help refine our life-cycle earnings 
estimates is to compare the actual and predicted earnings for respondents who are already 
claiming.  
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Figure 2. Fraction already receiving benefits by current work status 
 
Notes: Authors' calculations using 1995 through 2019 SCF.   
DB pension wealth 
The published SCF wealth concept — based on balance sheet components 
directly measured in the survey — does not include SSW or DB pension wealth. As with 
Social Security, the wealth equivalent of a stream of future DB pension incomes is a 
survival-adjusted present value. Those wealth equivalents are constructed using survey 
information about currently received pension benefits, expected future pensions, and 
pensions associated with current jobs, using the same differential mortality model and 
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benchmarked to the aggregate from the Financial Accounts of the United States (FA), 
and pension wealth distribution is benchmarked against direct measures from the HRS. 
Details of the DB wealth estimates used here follow (see also Sabelhaus and Volz 
2019).  
The SCF collects comprehensive, detailed information about retirement plans 
associated with current and past jobs of the respondent and their spouse or partner. 
The measure of wealth consistent with the comprehensive household balance sheet is 
the present value of those future DB benefits, which is equivalent to the value of the 
financial assets held now that will be liquidated over time to pay the promised stream of 
DB benefits when those liabilities come due. The SCF collects details about DB pension 
benefits in three different survey modules. The three categories cover DB benefits 
already being received, DB benefits associated with a past job where the known benefit 
amount will be received at a specific future date, and DB benefits associated with a 
current job, where the ultimate benefit will depend on how much longer the worker is 
covered by the plan and their final salary.  
The survey questions about currently received benefits and expected benefits 
from past job pensions are standard. The respondent is simply asked how much is 
currently being received, or how much will be received when the benefit begins. For our 
purposes, these streams of benefit payments are the input to a present value 
calculation that also involves an assumed interest rate and respondent expected (and 
demographically differentiated) mortality. This present value calculation is the level of 
financial assets that the retirement plan sponsor must hold to pay promised benefits 
and, thus, corresponds directly to the household wealth measure we are trying to 
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capture. In total, these present value calculations for SCF respondents indicate that 
about 40% of the aggregate DB pension assets in the FA is attributable to the promised 
benefits of currently receiving and past job pensioners, and thus the remainder is 
accumulated for workers still on the jobs for which they are accumulating the rights to 
future DB benefits.  
Calculating DB pension wealth for workers covered by a plan on their current job 
is more complicated, because the benefit that will eventually be received is unknown as 
of the survey date, and, in any event, that eventual benefit is likely different from the FA 
benchmark termination concept. The SCF asks a series of questions about the current 
job’s DB pensions, including how long the worker has been in the plan, when they 
expect to receive benefits, and how much they expect to receive after benefit payments 
begin. As with SSW, these questions make it possible to construct a few different 
measures of what the stream of future benefits represents in present value. For 
example, it is possible to compute the present value of the future benefit stream 
assuming the worker remains in the job until his or her expected retirement age, for a 
given projected final salary, and under the assumption that the worker knows and 
reports values consistent with the actual benefit formula in the survey. DB benefit 
formulas are generally based on a complicated combination of years of service and 
average “high” salary, and those formulas are generally beyond the grasp of survey 
participants. Of course, if constructed properly, this “continuation” value of the DB 
pension is an important and useful concept when thinking about life-cycle financial 
planning. 
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The continuation value represents what the DB pension could be worth to the 
worker at some point, based on a series of assumptions about future employment and 
earnings under the current plan rules. However, the measure of DB wealth that 
corresponds to total household wealth in the FA is the narrower financial liability of 
retirement plan sponsors: The DB wealth that the worker has accumulated to date. Plan 
sponsors are not required to set aside the continuation value of a pension for every 
worker in their plans. Rather, DB plans are required to hold only the present value of 
benefits already earned by the worker, the “termination” value, which corresponds to DB 
wealth in the FA. The termination value represents the worker’s legal claim to DB wealth 
because that level of assets is equivalent to the present value of benefits they will 
receive if their plan coverage ended today. The termination value of a DB pension is 
always less than or equal to the continuation value, and the two converge as the worker 
approaches retirement age, at which point they are equal. 
Our approach to solving for DB pension termination values for current workers in 
the SCF relies on three complementary sources of information. The first piece of 
information is the aggregate value of DB pension assets from the FA. After subtracting 
the roughly 43% of total assets accounted for by currently received and known future 
benefits (as described above), the remainder represents the legal claims (termination 
values) of current-job DB participants. The second set of inputs, from the SCF, is the 
worker’s age, the number of accumulated years of plan coverage, earnings, and sector 
(private or public) of the job held by the worker. Finally, the calculation involves data 
from Fang, Brown, and Weir (2016) from HRS to validate our estimated person-level 
termination values. After building in a wedge between public and private sector DBs 
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(public plans are more generous than private, relative to earnings), the actuarial present 
value calculations used to construct termination values are based on the same 
differential mortality model we also use for estimating SSW.  
Aggregate household wealth 
In 2019, SCF published household net worth was roughly $96 trillion, up from 
$21 trillion in 1995. As a prelude to the distributional and life-cycle analysis of the 
expanded wealth measures that include DB and SSW, it is useful to put the three 
aggregates side by side over time. How large are DB wealth and SSW relative to 
published SCF net worth? Are those ratios changing over time? How is the ratio of each 
evolving relative to aggregate income? In doing so, we establish important facts about 
the various constructs that are key for the distributional analysis later. For example, 
although aggregate SSW is large relative to other wealth components in every year of 
our sample, it is not growing as fast as SCF published net worth. The size and growth of 
SSW depends on whether one looks at expected or termination SSW, the choice of 
discount rates, and whether one considers scheduled or payable benefits.  
In 2019, aggregate net worth in the SCF was about $96 trillion, and aggregate 
DB pension wealth was about $19 trillion (Table 1). The estimates of aggregate SSW in 
2019 ranged from as low $19 trillion to as high as $40 trillion, depending on the specific 
wealth concept — expected or termination — along with the assumptions about what 
rates to use for discounting future taxes and benefits, and whether future benefits are as 
scheduled or limited to payable under current OCACT projections. Termination SSW is 
always above expected SSW. Payable benefits are always lower and declining as a 
share of scheduled benefits over time, because we are getting closer to insolvency as 
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we move through the sample period. Finally, choosing OCACT real discount rates 
instead of the fixed 2.8% real rate is generally benign before 2016.  
Most of our focus in what follows is on expected SSW, but it is worth noting here 
that aggregate termination SSW is notably higher than aggregate expected SSW in all 
years. Under the expected SSW concept, on average, the PDV of benefits reflects the 
higher benefit the worker will receive because of additional years worked, but that 
comes at the cost of additional taxes. Careful consideration of the Social Security 
benefit formula makes it clear why termination SSW is higher for many participants, 
especially the young. A young worker with high lifetime earnings will have a low average 
indexed monthly earnings (AIME) because they have many zeroes in their work history. 
If they stop working when young, they will be entitled to the benefit replacement rate of 
a lifetime low earner, which is a higher rate of return. Additional years of work raises 
their AIME and reduces the rate of return on additional taxes paid.  
The substantial difference between payable and scheduled expected SSW is 
growing over our sample period, but not because of changes in assumptions about 
Social Security Trust Fund asset reserves depletion. The payable scenarios for every 
survey wave assume that 80% of benefits will be payable after 2034, consistent with 
recent Trustees Reports. The ratio of payable to scheduled expected SSW fell from 
about 90% to 80% after 1995. Barring policy change, the ratio will continue falling as we 
get closer to 2035. Indeed, it is worth noting that 80% is not the lower bound on payable 
relative to scheduled SSW: 80% is the long-run ratio of payable benefits relative to 
scheduled benefits. The payable scenarios assume that taxes are still collected as 
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scheduled, and with the PDV of taxes at roughly one-third the PDV of scheduled 
benefits, the long-run projected ratio of scheduled to payable SSW is more like 50%.  
The rate used to discount future taxes and benefits turns out to be important for 
SSW, especially in this current era of low real interest rates. In general, our fixed 2.8% 
real rate specification lines up well with the year-by-year OCACT real discount rates. 
This is to be expected because 2.8% is the average real discount rate used by OCACT 
over this period. The similarity breaks down after 2013, however. Our estimated SSW 
grows systematically (relative to aggregate income) for life-cycle reasons in the second 
half of the sample period as the Baby Boom generation ages and approaches benefit 
claiming, but the jump in SSW after 2013 using the OCACT discount rates greatly 
magnifies that increase. After 2013, OCACT lowered their assumed long-term discount 
rate, but most of the effect on PDVs comes from changes in the OCACT assumptions 
about how quickly interest rates transition from low current values to the assumed long-
run rate.  
The discount rate’s impact on the PDVs is substantial. Indeed, if taken to logical 
extremes, it effectively drives the relationship between SSW and other household 
wealth. That, in turn, drives how including SSW affects overall wealth inequality. If one 
pegs the discount rate to move in step with, say, observed market interest rates, it is 
possible to generate very rapid growth in aggregate SSW (Catherine, Miller, and Sarin 
2020). In our framework, similar aggregate SSW growth for our sample period can be 
generated using a 1% real discount rate after 2013, which leads over $40 trillion in SSW 
in 2019, nearly double the baseline estimate. Because adding SSW is always wealth-
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equalizing in levels, that much additional growth in SSW is basically enough to offset 
rising concentration in the other components of household wealth.20 
The choice of discount rate is a philosophical conundrum because there is 
obviously no market in which future Social Security tax liabilities and benefit claims are 
traded. SSW is clearly unlike the financial instruments for which interest rates have 
fallen in recent years, as the government can change taxes and benefits in response to 
system financing problems. Acknowledging that unique (and increasingly relevant) risk 
would likely offset the declining time value of money in a complete discounting 
framework. The real question is how the choice of discount rate affects life-cycle 
behavior, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
                                               
20 A direct comparison with Catherine, Miller, and Sarin (2020) is not possible because the 
empirical framework for combining SCF wealth and estimated SSW is fundamentally different. 
We use the SCF microdata to generate earnings histories and expectations, which are used to 
estimate SSW, and we use our estimates of DB wealth from Sabelhaus and Volz (2019). 
Catherine, Miller, and Sarin (2020) use another microdata set to estimate aggregate SSW, 
then splice the estimates into the published SCF wealth distributions.  
35 
Table 1. Wealth aggregates by year (billions) 
  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
                    
SCF Published Net Worth  $  21,101   $  29,087   $  42,338   $  50,354   $  64,649   $  58,207   $  64,748   $  86,865   $  96,073  
+ Defined Benefit Wealth  $    5,943   $    7,044   $    8,457   $  10,031   $  11,923   $  13,474   $  15,904   $  17,683   $  19,092  
= Household Wealth  $  27,044   $  36,131   $  50,795   $  60,385   $  76,572   $  71,681   $  80,651   $104,548   $115,165  
                    
  Baseline Scheduled Benefits Scenario 
Expected Social Security Wealth  $    6,469   $    7,573   $    9,507   $  11,529   $  14,177   $  16,180   $  19,382   $  21,589   $  23,931  
  = PDV Expected Benefits  $  12,494   $  14,525   $  17,614   $  20,549   $  24,407   $  27,168   $  31,139   $  34,246   $  38,254  
  - PDV Expected Taxes  $    6,025   $    6,952   $    8,107   $    9,021   $  10,230   $  10,988   $  11,757   $  12,657   $  14,323  
             
Termination Social Security Wealth  $    9,649   $  11,246   $  13,782   $  16,361   $  19,455   $  21,929   $  25,497   $  28,269   $  31,378  
  Baseline Payable Benefits Scenario 
Expected Social Security Wealth  $    5,904   $    6,758   $    8,354   $    9,968   $  12,054   $  13,517   $  16,011   $  17,569   $  18,895  
  = PDV Expected Benefits  $  11,929   $  13,709   $  16,461   $  18,989   $  22,285   $  24,505   $  27,768   $  30,226   $  33,217  
  - PDV Expected Taxes  $    6,025   $    6,952   $    8,107   $    9,021   $  10,230   $  10,988   $  11,757   $  12,657   $  14,323  
             
Termination Social Security Wealth  $    9,423   $  10,907   $  13,244   $  15,581   $  18,330   $  20,439   $  23,471   $  25,708   $  28,018  
   Scheduled Benefits Using OCACT Discount Rates  
Expected Social Security Wealth  $    6,656   $    6,541   $    8,489   $  10,327   $  13,230   $  14,891   $  18,561   $  27,575   $  32,846  
  = PDV Expected Benefits  $  12,361   $  13,104   $  16,333   $  19,012   $  23,238   $  25,484   $  30,273   $  42,710   $  50,484  
  - PDV Expected Taxes  $    5,705   $    6,564   $    7,844   $    8,685   $  10,008   $  10,593   $  11,712   $  15,135   $  17,637  
             
Termination Social Security Wealth  $    9,402   $  10,281   $  12,973   $  15,358   $  18,703   $  20,785   $  25,035   $  34,813   $  40,432  
Addendum: Permanent Income  $    4,461   $    5,258   $    6,916   $    8,020   $    9,401   $    9,843   $  10,496   $  12,673   $  13,253  
Notes: Author's calculations using 1995 through 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances. Baseline scenarios set fixed real discount rate 
to 2.8% for all years. OCACT discount rates are from the annual data underlying each year's Trustees Report. 
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4. Impact of SSW on top wealth shares 
A primary motivation for this work is understanding how including SSW affects 
estimated levels and trends in wealth inequality. Any distributional analysis of that sort 
requires that we make decisions about how to sort and weight observations. There are 
three key decisions, (1) whether to sort the entire population or sort within age groups, 
(2) whether to weight observations to keep a given number of households versus a 
given number of persons in a distributional group, and (3) whether to re-sort when the 
wealth measure is more expansive. Our sorting and weighting approach intends to 
maintain consistency between overall and within-age inequality, and to purge the effects 
of evolving living arrangements (both over the life cycle and over calendar years). Thus, 
we sort within an individual’s age group and weight by persons (respondents and 
spouse/partners), both of which decrease levels of a given top wealth share but do not 
affect trends. The decision about whether to re-sort after adding SSW turns out to have 
little impact on estimated top wealth shares.  
These decisions about sorting and weighting have a substantial impact on 
estimated SCF wealth shares in every survey year, but the trend is largely unaffected 
(Table 2). The reference point for what follows is the published SCF top 1% and top 
10% wealth shares, shown in the first line of the top and bottom panels of Table 2, 
respectively. The published SCF wealth shares are based on sorting households (not 
persons) across the entire population (not within age groups). Under those sorting 
decisions, and using the narrow published SCF wealth concept, the top 1% wealth 
share increased about 4 percentage points over our study period, and the top 10% 
wealth share increased almost 10 percentage points. 
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Adding defined benefit (DB) pension wealth to the published SCF top shares 
lowers the estimated levels of wealth concentration but does not reverse the trend 
toward greater wealth inequality (second line in each panel of Table 2). Using the same 
household-weighted sorting approach with the household wealth measure that includes 
DB pension wealth, the top 1% wealth share falls from about 35% to about 28% in 
1995, but still rises substantially over the study period. Likewise, the top 10% wealth 
share falls from about 68% to about 61% in 1995, but again, increases 10 percentage 
points. Indeed, these can be interpreted as deepening concerns about wealth inequality, 
because the same percentage point increases are being applied to a lower base, so the 
proportional increases are larger. 
Under the traditional household weighted sorting irrespective of age, the share of 
SCF household wealth (published plus DB) held by the top 10% increased from about 
61 to about 71% between 1995 and 2019. When we sort households within their own 
(10-year) age groups — effectively capturing the top 10% of each age group in each 
year — the top 10 wealth share increases from about 56% to about 66%. When, in 
addition, we change the weighting to capture a fixed percentage of respondents and 
spouse/partners in each wealth group (irrespective of living arrangements), the top 10 
share rises from about 53% in 1995 to about 62% by 2019. The two sorting and 
weighting adjustments have the expected effects at each point in time, as the young rich 
are less rich than the old rich, and the rich are more likely to be married. Although the 
decisions about how to sort and weight are contentious from a normative perspective, 
our decision to go with the more leveling assumptions is driven by our goal of 
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comparing wealth across and within age groups over time using a consistent frame. The 
various measures show similar trend increases.  
For completeness (and reader choice), we show the top wealth shares including 
SSW under all three weighting and sorting permutations, and in addition, we show the 
effects of re-sorting by the expanded total wealth measure. The impact of adding SSW 
is substantial, dramatically reducing estimated top wealth shares in every year, as 
expected. However, the percentage point increases in top wealth shares are similar 
and, thus, as before, the relative increase is even larger, because the base is lower. 
Again, our preferred weighting and sorting approach is the “person-weighted within age 
groups” because it eliminates the confounding effects of life-cycle wealth (we are not 
grouping the young low wealth with the old low wealth; they are low wealth for different 
reasons) and the effects of marital trends (marriage rates have fallen more for the less 
wealthy).  
Under our preferred sorting and weighting approach, the estimated top 10% 
comprehensive wealth (household wealth plus SSW) share increased from about 45% 
in 1995 to about 54% in 2019, a 20% increase. The final decision is whether to re-sort 
by the comprehensive wealth measure. The good news from our perspective is that it 
does not matter — the estimated wealth shares are basically unaffected. Therefore, we 
choose to sort by household wealth for the distributional analysis that follows. The fact 
that re-sorting does not matter simply shows that — after controlling for age and family 
size — adding SSW does not meaningfully change individuals’ relative positions in the 
wealth distribution.  
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Table 2. Estimated top wealth shares 
  
Top 1 Percent Wealth Shares 
  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
SCF Published Wealth Shares                   
     Household Sorting (by Published Wealth) 34.8% 33.8% 32.1% 33.2% 33.6% 34.1% 35.5% 38.5% 37.2% 
Household Wealth Shares                   
     Household Sorting 27.7% 27.9% 27.4% 28.1% 29.0% 28.8% 29.0% 32.5% 31.5% 
     Household Sorting within Age Groups 24.7% 25.1% 24.0% 25.0% 26.0% 25.1% 25.9% 28.9% 28.1% 
     Person-Weighted Sorting within Age Groups 23.7% 23.4% 22.5% 23.4% 24.0% 22.7% 23.9% 26.8% 25.9% 
Household + Social Security Wealth Shares            
     Household Sorting 22.9% 23.6% 23.5% 24.1% 24.9% 24.0% 23.9% 27.4% 26.6% 
     Household Sorting within Age Groups 20.3% 21.1% 20.5% 21.3% 22.3% 20.8% 21.2% 24.3% 23.6% 
     Person-Weighted Sorting within Age Groups 19.4% 19.6% 19.2% 19.9% 20.5% 18.8% 19.6% 22.5% 21.8% 
     Person-Weighted within Age Groups, Resorted 19.3% 19.6% 19.1% 19.9% 20.5% 18.9% 19.5% 22.5% 21.8% 
  
Top 10 Percent Wealth Shares 
  1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
SCF Published Wealth Shares                   
     Household Sorting (by Published Wealth) 67.9% 68.6% 69.6% 69.4% 71.4% 74.4% 75.0% 77.1% 76.5% 
Household Wealth Shares                   
     Household Sorting 61.5% 63.3% 64.1% 64.5% 67.1% 68.5% 68.8% 71.5% 71.3% 
     Household Sorting within Age Groups 55.5% 58.3% 59.5% 59.0% 62.7% 62.2% 63.1% 66.0% 65.9% 
     Person-Weighted Sorting within Age Groups 52.7% 55.6% 56.6% 56.1% 59.8% 59.2% 59.6% 62.8% 62.3% 
Household + Social Security Wealth Shares            
     Household Sorting 54.7% 56.7% 57.9% 58.2% 60.3% 60.3% 60.2% 63.6% 63.4% 
     Household Sorting within Age Groups 48.0% 51.0% 52.9% 52.1% 55.4% 53.8% 54.1% 57.6% 57.6% 
     Person-Weighted Sorting within Age Groups 45.3% 48.4% 50.0% 49.4% 52.6% 50.9% 50.9% 54.5% 54.1% 
     Person-Weighted within Age Groups, Resorted 45.1% 48.4% 50.0% 49.2% 52.5% 50.8% 50.7% 54.4% 54.2% 
Note: Authors' calculations using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Household wealth is SCF published wealth plus Defined 
Benefit (DB) pension wealth. Social Security Wealth (SSW) estimates constructed using baseline 2.8 percent real discount rate. 
Unless otherwise noted, wealth concept for sorting is household wealth. 
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5. Wealth inequality across and within age groups 
The first part of the distributional analysis using our expanded wealth measures 
focuses on wealth inequality across and within age groups. We compare real average 
wealth holdings by age in 1995 and 2019, first for entire age groups, then for the bottom 
50% wealth group, the 50th through 90th percentile wealth group, and the top 10% 
wealth group within each age group. As described in the previous section, the wealth 
groups are person-weighted and sorted within age groups, using the household wealth 
(SCF published plus DB) wealth concept. We focus on three main wealth components: 
nonretirement wealth, retirement wealth (DC and DB), and SSW. We show how each 
component of wealth contributes to the overall age group average, and the extent to 
which the contribution of expected SSW to overall wealth varies between the scheduled 
benefits and payable scenarios.  
We begin the decomposition by looking across age groups in 1995 and 2019 
(Figure 3). The columns stack average wealth by type — expected SSW, retirement, 
and nonretirement wealth — in 1995 and 2019. The third bar in each age group is the 
2019 value with expected SSW reduced according to the payable scenario. In general, 
the main takeaways from the overall age group averages in Figure 3 are (1) average 
nonretirement wealth is the largest component, but the relative importance varies with 
age; (2) overall average wealth increased across all age groups between 1995 and 
2019; (3) average wealth increased much more at older ages; and (4) the impact of 
assuming payable benefits is only very noticeable (against the backdrop of a 
comprehensive wealth measure) at younger ages.  
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Figure 3. Mean wealth by age, 1995 and 2019 
 
Notes: Author's calculations based on 1995 and 2019 SCFs. Retirement wealth includes DB 
and DC plans. Social Security Wealth (SSW) is the baseline expected concept, using real 



























Figure 4. Mean wealth by age, 1995 and 2019, bottom 50% wealth group 
 
Notes: Author's calculations based on 1995 and 2019 SCFs. Retirement wealth includes DB 
and DC plans. Social Security Wealth (SSW) is the baseline expected concept, using real 
discount rate of 2.8%. 
Our within- and across-age group wealth inequality analysis is motivated by a 
growing realization that the gap between older (wealthier) and younger (less wealthy) 
wealth groups may be growing much faster than the gap between high and low wealth 
overall or within a given age group. This is borne out when looking within age groups by 
wealth (Figures 4, 5, and 6). Younger people in the bottom 50% wealth group have 























bottom 50% at older ages have seen wealth gains, though much of that is because of 
increased expected SSW. Indeed, average wealth for the bottom 50% at most ages is 
dominated by expected SSW, and the payable SSW bars, show, for example, that 
switching from scheduled to payable SSW in the 55 to 64 age group eliminates almost 
all of the gains in expected SSW over the 25 year period, reinforcing the net decline in 
average wealth associated with the other two components.  
Figure 5. Mean wealth by age, 1995 and 2019, 50th to 90th percentile wealth group 
 
Notes: Author's calculations based on 1995 and 2019 SCFs. Retirement wealth includes DB 
and DC plans. Social Security Wealth (SSW) is the baseline expected concept, using real 

























Average wealth in the 50th through 90th percentile wealth group has risen much 
more at older ages, though again only modestly so or even falling at the youngest ages 
(Figure 5). It is noteworthy that again, increases in expected SSW — mostly driven by 
higher lifetime earnings leading to higher benefits — are increasing average wealth in 
many age groups. However, acknowledging that those benefits are not expected to be 
payable eliminates most of that gain for younger cohorts. It is also interesting to note 
that retirement wealth (the sum of DB and DC wealth) accounts for a substantial share 
of wealth for those in the 50th to 90th percentile wealth group, especially those 
approaching retirement. Nonretirement wealth is also increasingly important for the 50th 
to 90th percentile wealth group at older ages, likely being driven by rising house values.  
The increase in average wealth is proportionally greatest for the oldest age 
groups in the top 10% of their respective wealth distributions (Figure 6). Expected SSW 
is barely noticeable on the top 10% column charts, and retirement wealth is also 
proportionally smaller. There are substantial percentage increases in average wealth for 
the top 10% by wealth in all age groups, clearly being driven by nonretirement wealth in 
the form of financial assets, closely held businesses, and real estate. The percentage 
gains are largest for the top 10% of wealth within the older groups, further reinforcing 
the old/wealthy versus young/less wealthy inequality narrative.  
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Figure 6. Mean wealth by age, 1995 and 2019, top 10% wealth group 
 
Notes: Author's calculations based on 1995 and 2019 SCFs. Retirement wealth includes DB 
and DC plans. Social Security wealth (SSW) is the baseline expected concept, using real 
discount rate of 2.8%. 
6. Life-cycle patterns of Social Security wealth 
The advantage of constructing longitudinal earnings for multiple SCF waves is 
the ability to follow the same birth cohorts over time in a pseudo-panel framework, 
which, in turn, makes it possible to construct life-cycle wealth profiles. The triennial 
structure of the SCF gives us up to nine pseudo-panel SSW observations per 10-year 
birth cohort over the quarter century span between 1995 and 2019. By connecting the 


























along the age dimension, we show how SSW starts out negative at young ages, 
increases steadily through retirement, and then gradually decreases as the remaining 
expected years of life (and thus years of expected benefit receipt) decline at older ages. 
Age ranges in which multiple cohorts overlap also show us how average SSW is 
evolving across cohorts, due to a combination of demographic (through spouse/survivor 
benefits) and lifetime earnings effects.  
We begin the life-cycle analysis with means of expected SSW for the 1930 to 
1939 through 1970 to 1979 birth cohorts (Figure 7). Each point represents the mean 
SSW for the indicated birth cohort, plotted at the midpoint of their 10-year age band. 
Thus, for example, the first marker (blue circle) for the 1940 to 1949 cohort is observed 
when they are (on average) 50 years old in the 1995 SCF. The subsequent blue 
markers then follow the 1940 to 1949 cohort forward across survey waves. In 1998, the 
mid-point of their age range was 53, and increasing by three years until they reached an 
average age of 74 in 2019. Similarly, the first time we observe the 1970-79 birth cohort 
is when their midpoint age was 20, in the 1995 SCF. By 2019, the midpoint of their age 
range was 44. In addition to following the same cohort across survey waves, the cohort-
age chart makes it possible to compare two birth cohorts at similar ages but in different 
survey years. For example, we observe the 1970 to 1979 cohort between ages 20 and 
44 in the nine survey waves, and we observe the 1960 to 1969 cohort between ages 30 
and 54. In the overlap range between cohorts — ages 30 to 44 in this case — we can 




Figure 7. Mean real expected SSW by birth cohort and age 
 
Notes: Values are per person for respondents and spouse/partners. Projected benefits include 
own worker and potential spouse and survivor when spouse/partner is observed. Actual benefits 
used for those already claiming. Taxes are based on own projected earnings. 
With those chart-reading principles in mind, we can interpret the estimates in 
Figure 7. First and foremost, there is a clear life-cycle pattern of SSW accumulation and 
decumulation. Average expected SSW is negative at younger ages, increases steadily 
through benefit claiming age, then declines slowly as the number of years of remaining 
benefit receipt falls with life expectancy. Second, although each cohort has its own 
























cohorts are also noteworthy. For example, the mean SSW estimates for the 1940 to 
1949 cohort lie above the 1930 to 1939 values in the age range overlap (ages 60 to 74) 
but the differences between younger cohorts are less clear or nonexistent. There are 
possible explanations involving data problems, including the fact that actual benefits 
may be more underreported at older ages, or the actual and estimated benefits may 
diverge for other reasons. However, there are also two economic forces that could be 
causing the convergence in cohort means: real earnings and auxiliary benefits. If lack of 
earnings growth means that a given cohort has the same average lifetime earnings 
profile as their predecessors, they will have the same expected SSW at any given age. 
If a given cohort has more earnings convergence between spouses but the same 




Figure 8. Expected SSW relative to income by birth cohort and age 
 
Notes: Values are relative to SCF permanent income measure. Projected benefits include own 
worker and potential spouse and survivor when spouse/partner is observed. Actual benefits 
used for those already claiming. Taxes are based on own projected earnings. 
The importance of differences in lifetime earnings across birth cohorts can be 
seen by normalizing estimated SSW by income (Figure 8).21 The immediate visual 
effect is to bring the cohort SSW points into a much clearer life-cycle alignment. This 
makes sense, because Social Security taxes and benefits are tied to incomes and are 
fully indexed, thus (other than changes such as the increased Full Retirement Age) real 
                                               
21 The specific income measure used is the SCF “usual” income proxy for normal income, which 
removes income fluctuations due to transitory income shocks. See Bhutta et al. (2020) for a 






















taxes and benefits depend only on real income. The estimated pattern of SSW 
accumulation relative to income is now very much in line with the theoretical discussion 
above (Section 2), systematically increasing relative to income through retirement age, 
before systematically declining at older ages. The remaining differences across cohorts 
(in the overlap regions) are attributable to factors such as demographics (through 
spouse and survivor benefits), earnings inequality (through benefit replacement rate 
differentials), and data (through the assumptions made to construct life-cycle earnings 
inputs at different ages). 
Figure 9. Expected/termination SSW relative to income by birth cohort and age 
 
Notes: Values are relative to SCF permanent income measure. Projected benefits include own 
worker and potential spouse and survivor when spouse/partner is observed. Actual benefits 





















Birth Cohort, Expected and termination 
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Figure 10. Expected SSW relative to income by birth cohort and age, scheduled 
and payable 
 
Notes: Values are relative to SCF permanent income measure. Projected benefits include own 
worker and potential spouse and survivor when spouse/partner is observed. Actual benefits 
used for those already claiming. Taxes are based on own projected earnings. 
Although most of our focus throughout the paper is on expected SSW, we also 
show the life-cycle means for termination SSW relative to income overlaid on the same 
chart with the expected SSW estimates (Figure 9). Termination SSW is above expected 
SSW at younger ages, and the two measures, as expected, converge at older ages. As 
noted above, under the expected SSW concept, on average, the PDV of benefits 
















1930-39 Scheduled 1930-39 Payable
1940-49 Scheduled 1940-49 Payable
1950-59 Scheduled 1950-59 Payable
1960-69 Scheduled 1960-69 Payable
1970-79 Scheduled 1970-79 Payable
Birth Cohort, Scheduled and Payable
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but that comes at the cost of additional taxes. Details about the Social Security benefit 
formula help make it clear why termination SSW is likely so much higher for many 
participants, especially at younger ages. A young worker with high lifetime earnings will 
have a low average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) because they have many zeroes 
in their work history. If they stop working when young, they will be entitled to the benefit 
replacement rate of a lifetime low earner, which is a higher rate of return. Additional 
years of work raises their AIME and reduces the rate of return on additional taxes paid. 
Our third cohort-age life-cycle SSW chart shows the effects of moving between 
the scheduled and payable scenarios (Figure 10). Under the payable scenario, we 
follow recent Trustees Reports in assuming that 80% of benefits are payable beginning 
in 2035. We apply the benefit reduction to all benefits paid from that point forward. The 
life-cycle chart shows that older cohorts (1930 to 1939 and 1940 to 1949) are 
somewhere between completely unaffected and only marginally affected, because most 
of their benefits will have been received before the Social Security trust fund asset 
reserves are expected to be depleted. Beginning with the 1950 to 1959 cohort — who 
will be between 76 and 85 in 2035 — the effect of benefit cuts become very 
noticeable.22As noted above, the SSW perspective implications for cohort fairness are 
worse than the 20% benefit cut suggests, because future cohorts will still be paying 
scheduled taxes. Thus, SSW will fall proportionally more than 20%.  
                                               
22 It is worth a reminder that the wedge between scheduled and payable here is not being driven 
by changes in expectations about system finances. Indeed, we use the estimated benefits 
payable ratio from the most recent Trustees Reports, effectively assuming those projections 
were the same in 1995 as they are today. 
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In addition to looking at life-cycle patterns using cohort averages, we can use the 
pseudo-panel approach to study within cohort patterns (Figure 11). The pseudo-panel 
approach works for any group decomposition in which the classifier is relatively stable 
between survey waves. Birth cohort itself is perfectly stable, because the probability of 
any given individual changing birth year from one survey wave to another is zero. We 
use the same household wealth classifier developed in Section 4 and used for the age 
group analysis in the last section to construct within-cohort patterns, which effectively 
assumes, for example, that a randomly sampled individual in the bottom half of their 
cohort wealth distribution in one survey year is unlikely to be in a different part of their 
cohort wealth distribution in a subsequent wave.23 The approach is still robust if the 
individuals who move back and forth across wealth groups are similar in terms of the 
outcome of interest, which in this case is expected SSW.  
The general patterns of SSW relative to income are similar across wealth groups, 
but the important differences show up in the growth of SSW relative to lifetime income 
during prime age working years. All three wealth groups have little or no SSW at age 
30. By age 60 or so, the bottom 50% wealth group has accumulated SSW roughly equal 
to 600% of their income at age 60. For the 50th to 90th percentile wealth group, 
accumulated SSW is roughly 400% of income around age 60. Finally, for the top 10% 
wealth group, the SSW ratio is around 100% of income at age 60. Note that this does 
not mean that average SSW is greater for low wealth individuals. It is still true that SSW 
                                               
23 This principle underscores the desirability of the “person-weighted within age group” approach 
to classifying observations for distributional analysis discussed in Section 4. Individuals are 
less likely to systematically change wealth groups and bias the pseudo-panel results if life-
cycle and demographic effects are removed.  
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rises with wealth because wealth rises with income, and SSW rises with income, at 
least for individuals on the verge of retirement at age 60. Indeed, average SSW peaks 
at just more than $150,000 for the bottom 50%, at just over $200,000 for the 50th to 90th 
percentile group, and around $250,000 for the top 10%. The negative relationship in 
Figure 11 is between SSW relative to income and household wealth, and a direct result 
of the progressive benefit formula.  
Figure 11. Mean real expected scheduled SSW relative to income by wealth group 
 
Notes: Values are relative to SCF permanent income measure. Projected benefits include own 
worker and potential spouse and survivor when spouse/partner is observed. Actual benefits 



















1930-39 Bottom 50 1930-39 50th to 90th 1930-39 Top 10
1940-49 Bottom 50 1940-49 50th to 90th 1940-49 Top 10
1950-59 Bottom 50 1950-59 50th to 90th 1950-59 Top 10
1960-69 Bottom 50 1960-69 50th to 90th 1960-69 Top 10
1970-79 Bottom 50 1970-79 50th to 90th 1970-79 Top 10
Birth Cohort and Wealth Group
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The relationship between SSW relative to income and other components of 
household wealth can also be interpreted in terms of life-cycle saving behavior. We can 
calculate the implied SSW saving rate by solving for SSW at age 60 using the formula 
SSW60 =  ∑ (s ∗ incomea) ∗  (1 + 𝑟𝑟)60−𝑎𝑎60a=30 , where a is age, s is the saving rate, and r is 
the real interest rate. The SCF pseudo panels suggest that the average real income 
growth rate for the bottom 50% during our sample period is about 1% per year between 
ages 30 and 60. The real prime-age income growth rate is about 2.3% for the 50th to 
90th percent wealth group, and 5.5 for the top 10% wealth group. Using our baseline 
discount rate (r = 2.8%), the observed SSW to income ratios translate into annual 
saving rates of about 15% for the lowest wealth group, 12% for the 50th to 90th 
percentile wealth group, and 5% for the top 10 wealth group. Conventional savings 
estimates based on observed household wealth suggest that lower lifetime income 
families save relatively little (Feiveson and Sabelhaus 2019). In fact, the analysis here 
shows that low (and even middle) wealth families just happen to be doing most of their 




In this paper, we begin with Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) microdata and 
create a more comprehensive measure of household wealth that includes the present 
discounted value of Social Security benefits less taxes, a concept we refer to as Social 
Security Wealth (SSW). There are four takeaways from this exercise. First, aggregate 
SSW is quantitatively important when compared to the other components of household 
wealth. Second, SSW is very skewed toward otherwise low-wealth families at any given 
age, so adding SSW has a big impact on estimated inequality levels. Third, adding SSW 
to conventional wealth measures does not change perceptions about inequality trends, 
such as the increase in top wealth shares, or the growing wealth gaps within and across 
age groups. Although gaps between high-wealth and low-wealth families are increasing 
generally, the gap between old high-wealth and young low-wealth families is exploding, 
especially if one considers that only 80% of benefits are expected to be payable 
beginning in 2035. Finally, including SSW helps us better understand typical life-cycle 
wealth profiles and saving patterns, as SSW rises steadily with age through retirement, 
then falls gradually with remaining lifespan. More importantly, growth of SSW relative to 
income — a measure of saving — differs systematically across wealth groups.  
The above takeaways are robust to data construction decisions regarding life-
cycle earnings and benefits, discounting, and the SSW concept itself, but there are 
several aspects of our approach that are deserving of further research. On the data 
front, there is a clear need to test alternative approaches to constructing life-cycle 
earnings profiles, perhaps multiply-imputing earnings using alternative data sources 
with longitudinal earnings histories where the donor records match SCF respondents in 
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terms of characteristics and common labor force and earnings variables. The benefit 
calculations can be expanded to include other benefit types, including disability and 
auxiliary benefits based on previous (and perhaps even prospective) marriages. The 
earnings history imputations and benefit calculator should also be checked against 
actual respondent-reported benefits in the SCF. In order to fully benchmark the SCF 
estimates against OCACT values (see Appendix), we will need to add the PDVs for 
individuals 15 and older who are not represented in the population of SCF respondents 
and who are either respondents or spouses/partners. Finally, given refined and 
benchmarked measures of SSW, it will be interesting to bring those measures to bear 
on explaining macroeconomic outcomes such as consumption and labor supply.  
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Appendix A. Benchmarking aggregate SSW to OCACT estimates 
The SCF-based SSW estimates reported in the text have a published counterpart 
going back to the 2001 survey (Appendix Table 1). The OCACT benchmarks are a 
byproduct of disaggregating the “infinite horizon” unfunded liabilities of the Social 
Security system. The starting point is to compute the discounted present value of all 
future taxes and all future benefits, take the difference, then add the current trust fund 
balance to measure the overall aggregate shortfall in present value terms. The 
decomposition in tables (which are available only since 2001) allocates the PDVs 
across past, current, and future participants. The groups closest to the SCF population 
is current participants, which is the population 15 and older in the year for which the 
calculations are being made.  
The SCF population we consider in this paper is a subset of the OCACT current 
participants group,  because we only compute SSW for SCF respondents and 
spouses/partners, which means we are excluding dependents and other persons 15 
and older (the “Non-Primary Economic Unit,” or “NPEU” in SCF parlance) living in  SCF 
households. Adult members of SCF households we miss include children still living with 
their parents, roommates, parents, or other older relatives living with respondents and 
spouses/partners. It may be feasible to study those individuals using the rudimentary 
SCF information that is collected, but for now, it is clear that we expect to calculate 
PDVs for taxes and benefits that are below OCACT, even if we have the earnings 
profiles right for respondents and spouse/partners.  
In general, the comparison of our estimated PDVs against published OCACT 
values is reassuring, though the effect of alternative discounting and differences 
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between the 62 and older and younger than 62 populations are notable and warrant 
further investigation. On the discounting front, there is little difference between simply 
using a 2.8% real discount rate and using the year-by-year OCACT discount factors 
through 2013. Between the 2013 and 2016 surveys, in addition to continued gradual 
lowering of assumed long-run real discount rates, OCACT moved to an alternative time 
path for closing the gap between the current (and persistently low) real discount rates 
and their long-run values, which has the effect of dramatically increasing SSW relative 
to earlier years. The differences in PDVs between the retirement age and preretirement 
populations is also notable and warrants further investigation, especially the low PDV of 
estimated taxes for the 62 and older population.  
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Appendix Table 1. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) present values 
  All Current Participants 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
PDV Expected Social Security          
  OCACT Published  $       10,542   $       12,552   $       16,265   $       19,735   $       26,100   $       31,400   $       37,566  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         8,489   $       10,327   $       13,230   $       14,891   $       18,561   $       27,575   $       32,846  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         9,507   $       11,529   $       14,177   $       16,180   $       19,382   $       21,589   $       23,931  
= PDV Expected Benefits          
  OCACT Published  $       23,200   $       27,351   $       34,257   $       40,321   $       51,600   $       62,000   $       72,721  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $       16,333   $       19,012   $       23,238   $       25,484   $       30,273   $       42,710   $       50,484  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $       17,614   $       20,549   $       24,407   $       27,168   $       31,139   $       34,246   $       38,254  
- PDV Expected Taxes          
  OCACT Published  $       12,658   $       14,799   $       17,992   $       20,586   $       25,500   $       30,600   $       35,155  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         7,844   $         8,685   $       10,008   $       10,593   $       11,712   $       15,135   $       17,637  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         8,107   $         9,021   $       10,230   $       10,988   $       11,757   $       12,657   $       14,323  
  Current Participants, Ages <62 
  2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
PDV Expected Social Security          
  OCACT Published  $         6,595   $         8,030   $       10,413   $       12,311   $       16,000   $       19,100   $       22,223  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         5,117   $         6,610   $         8,361   $         8,815   $       10,769   $       16,170   $       19,180  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         6,041   $         7,688   $         9,214   $         9,900   $       11,587   $       11,964   $       12,722  
= PDV Expected Benefits          
  OCACT Published  $       18,944   $       22,418   $       27,928   $       32,225   $       40,600   $       48,400   $       55,826  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $       12,926   $       15,257   $       18,290   $       19,300   $       22,360   $       31,152   $       36,596  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $       14,113   $       16,670   $       19,365   $       20,779   $       23,224   $       24,478   $       26,839  
- PDV Expected Taxes          
  OCACT Published  $       12,349   $       14,388   $       17,515   $       19,914   $       24,600   $       29,300   $       33,603  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         7,809   $         8,647   $         9,930   $       10,485   $       11,590   $       14,982   $       17,415  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         8,072   $         8,982   $       10,151   $       10,878   $       11,637   $       12,514   $       14,117  
  Current Participants, Ages 62+   
  2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 
PDV Expected Social Security          
  OCACT Published  $         3,947   $         4,522   $         5,852   $         7,424   $       10,100   $       12,300   $       15,343  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         3,372   $         3,717   $         4,869   $         6,076   $         7,792   $       11,405   $       13,666  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         3,466   $         3,840   $         4,963   $         6,280   $         7,795   $         9,625   $       11,209  
= PDV Expected Benefits          
  OCACT Published  $         4,256   $         4,933   $         6,329   $         8,096   $       11,000   $       13,600   $       16,895  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $         3,407   $         3,755   $         4,948   $         6,185   $         7,914   $       11,558   $       13,888  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $         3,501   $         3,879   $         5,043   $         6,389   $         7,915   $         9,768   $       11,415  
- PDV Expected Taxes          
  OCACT Published  $            309   $            411   $            477   $            672   $            900   $         1,300   $         1,552  
  SCF, OCACT Discount Rates  $              35   $              38   $              79   $            108   $            122   $            153   $            222  
  SCF, Fixed Real Rate=2.8%  $              35   $              39   $              79   $            110   $            120   $            143   $            206  
Notes: OCACT values for 2013 and 2016 from Trustees Report appendix tables, prior years and 2019 are from various tables in the 
Financial Report of the US Government. SCF values based on "expected" SSW concept as described in text.
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Appendix B. Details on differential mortality correction 
The computation of Social Security and Defined Benefit pension wealth requires 
conditional survival probabilities for every SCF respondent and spouse/partner from 
their current age through age 100. The starting point for individual mortality is the 
average mortality rate by gender, cohort, and age from the Social Security 
Administration Office of the Chief Actuary website: 
www.ssa.gov/OACT/HistEst/Death/2019/DeathProbabilities2019.html. The second step 
is a differential mortality adjustment based on Chetty et al. (2016) that assigns relative 
mortality by income within each gender and cohort group.  
The Chetty et al (2016) analysis of differential mortality uses linked income tax 
and Social Security death records for the period 2001 through 2014. The specific data 
file we use has number of deaths and populations by gender, income percentile (1 to 
100), age (40 to 76), and year (2001 to 2014). The data are available at 
https://healthinequality.org/data/. There are various ways to process the differential 
mortality estimates to make them suitable for linking to a data file such as the SCF. We 
use a method that automatically preserves average mortality within gender, age, and 
birth cohort groups.  
The first step in processing the Chetty et al. (2016) mortality data is to compute 
death rates for each year, gender, age, and income percentile group. We then average 
over the 14 years of data, which means we are not attempting to capture and project 
any relative mortality trends over time. The third step is to compute overall average 
mortality for each gender and age group, and the fourth step involves dividing percentile 
group mortality by average mortality to compute relative mortality for each income 
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percentile within the gender and age group. By working with relative mortality rates in 
this way, we know that the weighted average (across income percentiles) mortality 
within a given gender and age group will match the average mortality when we merge to 
a data set with mortality by gender and age across birth cohorts, so long as the 
matching data has 100 equally weighted income percentile groups. We also further 
smooth relative mortality in an additional step by regressing relative mortality on a cubic 
polynomial in income percentile. Those smoothed relative mortality rates are then 
multiplied by the Social Security cohort by gender and age mortality rates to provide 
absolute mortality. Values of relative mortality for ages between 76 and 100 are linearly 
interpolated to converge to one at age 100.  
Appendix C. Improving SCF life-cycle earnings imputations using 
HRS-SSA-linked administrative earnings records 
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) labor force and earnings modules have 
provided the key inputs needed to estimate life-cycle earnings and thus Social Security 
Wealth (SSW) in this research to date. Our ongoing research is focused on using Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) data linked to Social Security Administration (SSA) 
earnings records to improve the life-cycle earnings imputations in the SCF. The 
approach involves creating comparable populations in the SCF and linked HRS along 
two dimensions. The first dimension is basic demographics, and the second is patterns 
of life-cycle labor force attachment within each of the demographic groups. After the 
data sets are reconciled, the last step is to explore various ways to use the life-cycle 
earnings details in the HRS-SSA data to impute year-by-year earnings for SCF 
respondents.  
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Linked HRS-SSA administrative earnings file 
The SCF data from the current job, labor force history, and work expectations 
modules used to estimate life-cycle earnings is described above (Main text, Section 3). 
Before describing how we are using HRS-SSA linked data to improve the SCF life-cycle 
earnings estimates, we discuss how we are developing the various public-use and 
restricted data sets available from HRS. Our starting point is the public-use HRS RAND 
longitudinal file, which pools and links information across survey respondents for HRS 
interview years 1992 through 2016. The RAND file is the source of the key demographic 
linking variables. 
We merge the HRS RAND file with processed restricted-use SSA administrative 
earnings data for 1951 through 2012 (using the HRS produced SSA “imputations” file) 
and then add in subsequent year by year records for those individuals from the detailed 
earnings file for years 2013 through 2016. The current HRS RAND file has 
approximately 42,000 records overall, and roughly 24,000 records have links to at least 
some SSA earnings data. However, many of the 42,000 observations are out-of-scope 
for our purposes because they were born before our first analysis cohort (1930 to 1939).   
Changes in respondent permission requirements for linking SSA earnings 
records imply that some observations have incomplete earnings — the respondent 
agreed to have their earnings linked in one survey wave and then changed their mind. 
With that in mind, we created the concept of “complete earnings” to indicate that the 
HRS respondent has SSA earnings available through the minimum of (1) their current 
age, (2) age 61, or (3) their year of death. With that restriction, we have about 14,000 
longitudinal observations with complete earnings within our analysis population. The 
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fraction of observations with complete earnings is just over 50% in the 1930s and 1940s 
birth cohorts, then drops to around 40% in the 1950s and 1960-64 birth cohorts. There 
are roughly 5,000 usable observations in the 1930s cohort, but that drops to about 
4,000 in the 1940s cohort, about 3,500 in the 1950s cohort, and about 1,700 in the 1960 
to 1964 birth cohort group.  
Reconciling demographic types across data sets 
The choice of demographic variables for disaggregating and aligning the HRS-
SSA and SCF populations is based on the tradeoff between variability in earnings levels 
and life-cycle profiles versus sample sizes across the demographic groups. The four 
key demographics we are currently working with include (1) birth cohort, (2) gender, (3) 
education, and (4) occupation. Our on-going work is focused on how to 
collapse/combine groups to efficiently preserve sample size in one or both data sets 
being reconciled.  
As indicated in the main text, the focus of our output is on 10-year birth cohorts 
born 1930 to 1939 and 1970 to 1979, but that does not mean we have to reconcile the 
samples by those same birth years. The HRS-SSA linked sample is generally limited to 
birth years before 1965 (there are a handful of spouses/partners born in 1965 and later, 
but those are not useful for our purposes). One key overarching question is the extent to 
which earnings levels and profiles have shifted across birth cohorts, especially for sub-
groups (men versus women, college educated versus others). Our current approach is 
focused on using three to four birth cohorts to disaggregate the samples at the birth 
cohort level. Within each cohort, the second (and binary) disaggregation is by gender. 
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Given those two top-level choices, each of the disaggregated cohort by gender data 
sets is still well populated, averaging about 1,500 longitudinal observations.  
Grouping by education and occupation are also key, because of well-known 
differences in earnings levels, life-cycle patterns, and variability across those groups 
after controlling for birth cohort and gender. Our on-going work is focused on balancing 
lost information (from aggregating) against sampling variability from creating groups that 
are too small. In terms of education, the key distinction is college educated versus all 
others. In terms of occupation, the SCF is somewhat limited to begin with as there are 
six occupational categories in the public-use data: We also distinguish wage earners 
versus self-employed workers. Thus, we collapse occupation in the SCF and HRS into 
five comparable groups: (1) managerial and professional, (2) sales and office, (3) 
service, (4) construction, maintenance, production, transportation, and (5) self-
employed.  
In simplest terms, this means the average 1,500 observations in each birth 
cohort/gender group are further divided into two education and five occupation groups. 
The longitudinal sample size is still fairly robust with 150 per birth 
cohort/gender/education/occupation group on average, but differences in the share of 
the populations in each demographic group mean that some of the samples are much 
smaller. Our current focus is on disaggregating in ways that preserve as much of the 
heterogeneity across groups as possible, by identifying and collapsing along 
dimensions where there are no statistically discernible differences.  
69 
Within-demographics variation in labor force attachment 
Disaggregating the HRS-SSA and SCF samples by demographics (birth cohort, 
gender, education, and occupation) is the first step in reconciling the data sets. 
However, estimating individual life-cycle earnings involves controlling for the 
heterogeneity in life-cycle labor supply within those groups. The demographic splits tell 
us how much the average person of a particular demographic type earned at a 
particular age, but average earning includes individuals with a range of labor force 
attachments. This step can best be thought of as assigning work status for every 
individual at every age, where work status is (1) part time, (2) full time, or (3) not 
working.  
The SCF labor force module metadata (see Section 3 in the main text) already 
provides what we need to identify the overall degree of labor force attachment for every 
individual. We know, for example, the number of years the individual has worked full 
time and part time. Although we do not know at exactly which years (meaning ages) the 
individual worked full-time, in most cases it is straightforward to make the inference. For 
example, most 62-year-old men will answer that they have worked full time for 
something like 40 to 44 years, and the answers are generally consistent with other 
known life-cycle outcomes such as whether they report having gone to college. Some 
labor force participation patterns are more complicated to recover, but the various 
answers respondents provide about their current job or longest career job are generally 
sufficient to piece together a reasonable life-cycle pattern.  
On the HRS-SSA side there is less metadata in one sense because the HRS 
only asks about the total number of years worked. Part-time and full-time years worked 
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are not distinguished in the HRS retrospective question. However, there is much more 
data in another sense because we know the exact earnings at every age from the linked 
SSA data. We are currently focused on allocating HRS person-level labor force 
attachment into part- and full-time and reconciling those (within demographic groups) 
with the SCF metadata. The first step within the HRS-SSA linked file is to reconcile the 
survey-based number of years worked variable with the count of non-zero earnings 
years in the SSA records. The second step is to then reconcile total years worked with 
the sum of part- and full-time years in the SCF by demographic group. The third step is 
to use the SCF part-time/full-time split and the actual earnings values in the linked HRS-
SSA data to reconcile life-cycle labor force attachment measures by age.  
Imputing annual earnings over the life cycle 
Disaggregating the SCF and HRS-SSA samples by both demographics and 
patterns of life-cycle labor force attachment is the first step in estimating life-cycle 
earnings for SCF respondents. The second step is modeling within-group, individual-
earnings heterogeneity conditional on the life-cycle labor force attachment measures. 
One aspect of earnings heterogeneity is how to control for differences between 
observed SCF earnings (in the year(s) for which we observe SCF earnings) relative to 
the average within the demographic group at the same point in the life cycle. The 
earnings heterogeneity adjustment also involves adjusting for the job type at the specific 
phase of the life cycle, meaning precareer, career, and post-career (or “bridge”) jobs.  
The SCF provides up to two distinct observations on individual earnings. If the 
individual is currently working, the SCF collects earnings details for their current and 
any second jobs. Regardless of whether the individual is working and has this “main” 
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job information, they are also asked about their longest lifetime job (or second longest, if 
their current job is their longest). If that “long” job is longer than five years, the 
respondent is asked detailed questions about that “long” job, including what they were 
earning when they left the job.  
This combination of questions about “main” and “long” jobs gives us up to two 
annual earnings observations per individual. In our current SCF life-cycle earnings 
imputations, those two data points, combined with estimated earnings profiles by 
gender and education, are used to fill in earnings at every point of the life cycle — both 
backward and forward relative to the respondent’s current age and age at which they 
left their “long” job. Those imputations, of course, reflect the labor force attachment 
variables (not working, part time, and full time).  
The same SCF earnings observations are the starting point when introducing 
heterogeneity using the linked HRS-SSA earnings data, but there are of course more 
options for exactly how to construct person-level year-by-year earnings imputations. 
The simplest approach is just to treat the differential between the SCF earnings and the 
HRS-SSA demographic group average earnings as a fixed effect and preserve that 
differential at all other points in the life cycle. That approach is similar to what we are 
currently doing with the SCF data, with the added information that comes from 
comprehensive life-cycle earnings profiles estimated using HRS-SSA across 
demographic types. More advanced approaches will involve multiple imputations that 
capture realistic variability around the life-cycle averages, using a standard permanent 
versus transitory shock decomposition, where those moments are estimated using the 
HRS-SSA longitudinal data. Again, as with our current approach, the actual earnings 
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imputation builds on the individual’s labor force attachment by age already inferred from 
the SCF meta data.  
Finally, the imputation involves adjusting for the job type at the specific phase of 
the life cycle, meaning precareer, career, and post-career (or “bridge”) jobs. Unadjusted 
earnings profiles have the well-known pattern of relatively rapid growth at young ages, 
followed by a gradual slowing of earnings growth, and eventually a decrease in earnings 
at older ages. These patterns vary by the demographic variables we are controlling for, 
but more importantly, the averages reflect moving from precareer (often part-time) to 
career (usually full-time) jobs, then moving back to post-career jobs (again, often part-
time). This distinction matters for our purposes because, for example, an individual who 
continues working in their career job at older ages generally does not experience an 
earnings decline and is thus accruing Social Security benefits at a different rate than a 
similar individual who has moved to a post-career job. Both the SCF and HRS-SSA data 
sets make it possible to identify these sorts of switches and, thus, we can impute life-
cycle earnings more efficiently for individuals based on where they are in terms of life-
cycle jobs.  
